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Abstract
We construct a statistical ensemble of games, where in each inde-
pendent subensemble we have two players playing the same game. We
derive the mean payoffs per move of the representative players of the
game, and we evaluate all the deterministic policies with finite mem-
ory. In particular, we show that if one of the players has a generalized
tit-for-tat policy, the mean payoff per move of both players is the same,
forcing the equalization of the mean payoffs per move of both players.
In the case of symmetric, non-cooperative and dilemmatic games, we
show that generalized tit-for-tat policies together with the condition
of not being the first to defect, leads to the highest mean payoffs per
move for the players.
1 Introduction
Game theory has been formalized by Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944, [1].
Their objective was to introduce into the language of economic theory some
mathematical tools for the quantitative analysis of the behaviour of economic
agents without a central authority. One of the Neumann and Morgenstern
arguments in favour of the usefulness of a theory of games is based on the
intrisic limited knowledge about the facts which economists deal with. This
argument has also been applied to the description of some physical systems
and to evolutionary theories in biology.
In the context of evolutionary biology and in order to analyse the logic
of animal conflict, Maynard-Smith [2] introduced a game theory approach to
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describe some of the evolutionary features of organisms. In the framework
of sociology, Axelrod [3] gave several examples where the game theoretical
framework is useful. In economics, there is today a vast literature on the
applicability of the game theoretical approach to economic decision [4], [5]
and [6]. More recently, the same type of formalism has been applied to
quantum mechanics [7].
In a game, a policy is a rule of decision for each player, and policies can
be deterministic, depending of the previous choices of one or of both players,
or can be stochastic. In a two-player non-cooperative game with a finite
number of choices or pure strategies, both players know the payoffs, make
their choices independently of each other, and know the past history of their
choices. It is also assumed that each player maximizes its payoff after a finite
or an infinite number of choices or moves.
An important problem is game theory is to determine which policies per-
form better than others. In this context, Axelrod, [3], proposed the following
problem: ”Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of ego-
ists without central authority?”. To help to answer this question a computer
tournament has been settled to decide which policy would perform better
in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, introduced by Dresher, Flood and
Tucker [8]. The tournament has been won by the tit-for-tat (TFT) policy,
submitted by Rapoport, [3, pp. 31]. The TFT policy consists in a simple
rule that says that one’s actual move is equal to what the other player did
in the previous move.
In fact, several approaches have been developed in order to decide which
policies perform better than others in infinitely iterated games. One of these
approaches relies on the concept of mixed strategy. In a game with several
possible choices or moves, a player has a mixed strategy if he has a probability
profile associated to all the possible moves of the game. Based on the concept
of mixed strategy, the replicator dynamics approach, [9] and [10], postulates
an evolution equation for the probability profiles of each player’s move. This
evolution equation implies a precise type of rationality of the players, and
the mixed strategy concept has a subjacent infinite memory associated to
the choices of the players.
The formal construction of game theory depends on the relation between
players and from whom they receive their payoffs. For example, we can
formalize a two-player game in such a way that the payoffs won by one player
are the losses of the other, [11]. Another approach is to consider that the
player’s payoffs are obtained from external sources. Our construction applies
to the second case and applies to games describing the global behaviour of
systems from economy, sociology and evolutionary biology.
The aim of this paper is to derive the mean payoffs of the ’representative
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players’ of a game, and to formulate the problem of deciding which policy
performs better than another in iterated non-cooperative games.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some of the
definitions that will be used along this paper, and we analyse and interpret
iterated non-cooperative games from the point of view of dynamical system
theory. In order to evaluate games and deterministic strategies with finite
memory, we take the point of view of uniform ensembles of statistical me-
chanics and we introduce the concept of representative ensemble of a game.
In this context, the players of the infinite set of games are substituted by the
’representative agents’ of the game.
In Section 3, we consider the case of a uniform ensemble of games, where
in each subensemble we have two players playing the same game. The mean
value of the payoffs per move taken over the uniform ensemble is calculated,
and gives information about the performance of a game. In Section 4, we eval-
uate the performance of deterministic strategies with finite memory length.
In the case where in each subensemble a player has a deterministic strategy
and the other makes his choices with equal probabilities, we calculate the
ensemble averages of the payoffs per move. The main results of sections 3
and 4 are summarized in Theorems 3.1 and 4.1, and Corollary 4.2. In par-
ticular, we show that if one of the players has a generalized tit-for-tat policy,
the mean payoff per move of both players is the same. Therefore, generalized
tit-for-tat is the best policy against exploitation.
In Section 5, we consider the case where the opponent players have de-
terministic policies, within the same memory class. In this case, the game
dynamics is a deterministic process, and the mean payoffs per move depend
on the initial moves of both players and on the policy functions of both play-
ers. Comparing all the possible deterministic strategies with memory length
1, we prove that, in dilemmatic games, the generalized tit-for-tat policy to-
gether with the condition of not being the first to defect, leads to the highest
possible mean payoffs per move for the players.
In Section 6, we apply the formalism developed in this paper to the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and to the Hawk-Dove games, and we analyse their state
space structure. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize the main conclusions of
the paper.
2 Formalism and definitions
We take a two-player game with two possible choices or moves — two pure
strategies. At times n ≥ 1, each player chooses, independently of the other,
one of the two possible pure strategies. These pure strategies are represented
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by the symbols ’0’ and ’1’. We denote by S = {0, 1} the set of pure strategies,
and by P and Q the two players. After a move, each player owns a profit or
payoff that is dependent of the opponent move. The payoff matrices of the
game are:
A =
(
A00 A01
A10 A11
)
, B =
(
B00 B01
B10 B11
)
where the payoff of P is Aij if player P plays i and Q plays j. In the same
move, Q has payoff Bij . If each player makes its choice independently of
the other, we are in the context of non-cooperative games. If B = AT , the
two-player game is symmetric. In the following, we analyze only the case of
symmetric and non-cooperative games.
In a two-player symmetric game, we say that a pure strategy i ∈ S is
dominant, [12], if Aij ≥ Akj, for every j = 0, 1, and Aij > Akj for some j and
k 6= i. For example, the symmetric and non-cooperative games with payoff
matrices,
A1 =
(
3 0
5 1
)
, A2 =
(
1 0
5 3
)
have ’1’ as dominant strategy (A10 > A00 and A11 > A01). In the first game,
if the two players choose both the dominant strategy ’1’, their payoffs is 1. In
the second game, the payoff of each players is 3, and the dominant strategy is
the right choice for both players. However, as A00 > A11 for the first game, if
both players choose the non-dominant strategy, their individual payoffs per
move is higher when compared with the choice of the dominant strategy by
both players.
These two examples suggest the following definition: A symmetric two-
player game is dilemmatic, if either,
A10 > A00 > A11 > A01 and 2A00 > A01 + A10 (2.1)
or,
A01 > A11 > A00 > A10 and 2A11 > A10 + A01 (2.2)
where the second inequalities in (2.1) and (2.2) have been introduced in order
to favour the non-dominant strategy.
In the first case of a dilemmatic game, (2.1), the strategy ’1’ is dominant.
In the second case, (2.2), ’0’ is the dominant strategy. If both players choose
the dominant strategy in one move, they get smaller payoffs than the ones
they could have obtained if both had chosen the non-dominant strategy.
In an iterated game with a fixed payoff matrix, players are always play-
ing the same game, and their payoffs accumulate. Therefore, a two-player
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iterated game is described by the two sequences of pure strategies of each
player,
µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn, . . .)
σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, . . .)
(2.3)
where µn and σn represent the choices of the players P and Q, respectively,
at discrete time n ≥ 1, and µn, σn ∈ S. The sequences (2.3), completely
specify the accumulated payoffs of both players. We call µ and σ the game
record sequences. In an infinitely iterated game, the accumulated payoff of
the players can be infinite. The mean payoffs per move are always finite and,
for a symmetric game, they are given by,
Gp = limn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1Aµiσi
Gq = limn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1Aσiµi
(2.4)
where Gp and Gq are the mean payoffs of players P and Q, respectively.
An example of a symmetric, non-cooperative, and dilemmatic game is
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In this game, we have two players with two
possible pure strategies, ’0’ and ’1’, and we have chosen the payoff matrix,
A =
(
3 −9
11 −5
)
(2.5)
As, A10 > A00 > A11 > A01 and 2A00 > A01 + A10, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game is dilemmatic with ’1’ as dominant pure strategy. The pure strategy
’0’ corresponds to cooperation and the pure strategy ’1’ to defection. For
a discussion about the importance of dilemmatic games and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, see the discussion in Axelrod, [3].
Following Neumann and Morgenstern [1], a strategy or policy is a set of
rules that tells each participant how to behave in every situation which may
arise. The only sources of information available to the players is the set of all
possible moves, their possible payoffs, and the history of the previous moves
of both players. To describe a rule of decision, policy, or strategy we can
adopt the Neumann-Morgenstern view where a rule of decision is specified
through the knowledge of a function of the m previous moves.
Deterministic strategy: In an iterated two-player game, with game
records µ and σ for players P and Q, respectively, a rule of decision or a
deterministic strategy with memory length m ≥ 1 for player P is a function
f : Sm → S such that,
µi = f(σi−m, ..., σi−1) (2.6)
for every i > m. Analogously, player Q has a deterministic strategy with
memory length n ≥ 1, if there exists a function g : Sn → S such that,
σi = g(µi−n, ..., µi−1)
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for every i > n.
In the following, deterministic policy and deterministic strategy have the
same meaning. In some game theory texts, the word ’strategy’ refers to ’pure
strategy’, an element of the set S = {0, 1}, and in other contexts if refers to
policies, as in ’tit-for-tat strategy’.
By definition, the outcome of a player’s choice or move at time i ≥ m+1
is determined by a finite number of previous moves of the other. In general,
we can take the functions f : Sm+n → S and g : Sr+s → S, and set,
µi = f(σi−m, ..., σi−1, µi−n, ..., µi−1)
σi = g(µi−r, ..., µi−1, σi−s, ..., σi−1)
In the following we will only analyze the case where each player’s choice
depends on a finite number of previous moves of the other, and m = n.
For example, adopting the definition of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy
given in the introduction, a TFT strategy with memory length m = 1 is
described by the boolean identity function f : S→ S, defined by,
f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1
Generalized tit-for-tat strategy (GTFT): We say that f : Sm → S is
a generalized tit-for-tat strategy with memory length m, if the number of ’0’
and ’1’ in f(σ(m)), when σ(m) runs over the set Sm, are equal. More formally,
f : Sm → S is a generalized tit-for-tat strategy with memory length m, if,
#{σ(m) ∈ Sm : f(σ(m)) = 0} = #{σ(m) ∈ Sm : f(σ(m)) = 1}
where σ(m) = (σ1, . . . , σm), and σi ∈ S.
To solve a game it is meant to find a procedure to determine for each
player’s choice which is the most favourable result ([1], [11] and [13]). In this
context, the concepts of mixed strategy and equilibrium state of a game are
fundamental tools in game theory.
A mixed strategy is a collection of probabilities associated to each player
and its pure strategies. The players P and Q have mixed strategies sp =
(s0p, s1p) and sq = (s0q, s1q), if each player plays pure strategy i with proba-
bility si∗. Obviously, s0∗ + s1∗ = 1.
In a symmetric game with two pure strategies and mixed strategies sp and
sq for players P and Q, respectively, the mean payoffs per move of players P
and Q are,
P : E(sp|sq) = s0p(s0qA00 + s1qA01) + s1p(s0qA10 + s1qA11)
= s0ps0qA00 + s0ps1qA01 + s1ps0qA10 + s1ps1qA11
Q : E(sq|sp) = s0q(s0pA00 + s1pA01) + s1q(s0pA10 + s1pA11)
= s0qs0pA00 + s0qs1pA01 + s1qs0pA10 + s1qs1pA11
(2.7)
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The time evolution of a game with mixed strategies sp and sq can be
seen as a stochastic processes with two independent random variables X and
Y . The random variables X and Y , associated to players P and Q, respec-
tively, have mean values given by (2.7). More precisely, X can assume the
values A00, A01, A10, A11 with probabilities s0ps0q, s0ps1q, s1ps0q and s1ps1q,
respectively. Analogously, Y takes values in the same set, with probabilities:
s0qs0p, s0qs1p, s1qs0p and s1qs1p. Therefore, the deviations from the mean
payoffs per move of the players, or the fluctuations from the mean values,
are characterised by the variances,
σ2p(sp|sq) = s0ps0q(A00 −E(sp|sq))2 + s0ps1q(A01 − E(sp|sq))2
+s1ps0q(A10 − E(sp|sq))2 + s1ps1q(A11 −E(sp|sq))2
σ2q (sq|sp) = s0qs0p(A00 −E(sq|sp))2 + s0qs1p(A01 − E(sq|sp))2
+s1qs0p(A10 − E(sq|sp))2 + s1qs1p(A11 −E(sq|sp))2
(2.8)
In general, E(sp|sq) 6= E(sq|sp), but, by a straightforward calculation, σ2p(sp|sq) =
σ2q (sq|sp).
Imposing the condition E(sp|sq) = E(sq|sp) in (2.7), a game or a mixed
strategy is equalitarian, if either, A01 = A10, or sp = sq.
To characterise the dynamics of an iterated symmetric game, we introduce
the concept of phase or state space of a game. The state space of a two-player
game is the convex closure of the points (A00, A00), (A11, A11), (A01, A10) and
(A10, A01), in the two-dimensional space of the payoffs of players P and Q.
Let us denote by K the state space of a game. As s0p, s0q ∈ [0, 1], then
(E(sp|sq), E(sq|sp)) ∈ K. In Fig. 1, we show the state space K for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoff matrix (2.5).
In an iterated game, the mean initial (at time n = 1) payoffs per move of
both players is (x1, y1) = (Aµ1σ1 , Aσ1µ1) ∈ K. By (2.4) and after n+1 moves,
the mean payoffs per move of both players is,
(xn+1, yn+1) = (
1
n+1
∑n+1
i=1 Aµiσi ,
1
n+1
∑n+1
i=1 Aσiµi)
= ( n
n+1
xn +
1
n+1
Aµn+1σn+1 ,
n
n+1
yn +
1
n+1
Aσn+1µn+1) ∈ K
(2.9)
and the iterated two-player game is dynamically described by a (non-deterministic)
one-to-many map, β : K → K, [14]. The equilibrium point or equilibrium
solution of a game is the point limn→∞(xn, yn).
For a given mixed strategy profile sp and sq of players P and Q, the ite-
rated two-player game has the equilibrium point, (E(sp|sq), E(sq|sp)) ∈ K.
As s0p, s0q ∈ [0, 1], the set of equilibrium states of the map β : K → K span
all the state space of a game.
For example, in a two-player game with the mixed strategy profiles sp =
7
Figure 1: State space K of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoff matrix
(2.5), where xn and yn are the mean payoffs per move of players P and Q,
as calculated from (2.9). The dots represent the mean payoff per move of an
instance of the iterated game with both players choosing strategies ’0’ and
’1’ with equal probabilities (sp = sq = 1/2). By (2.7), the equilibrium of the
game is the point (0, 0), and the standard deviations of the mean payoffs of
the players are σp = σq =
√
59 = 7.68, calculated from (2.8).
(1/2, 1/2) and sq = (1/2, 1/2), by (2.7), the equilibrium point of the game is,
(
1
4
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11),
1
4
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)) (2.10)
By (2.8), the fluctuations around the equilibrium are,
σ2p((1/2, 1/2)|(1/2, 1/2)) = σ2q ((1/2, 1/2)|(1/2, 1/2))
= 1
42
(3A200 + 3A
2
01 + 3A
2
10 + 3A
2
11
−2A00(A01 + A10 + A11)− 2A11(A01 + A10)− 2A01A10)
(2.11)
In Fig. 1, we represent several iterates of the map β for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game with payoff matrix (2.5), and mixed strategies sp = sp =
(1/2, 1/2). In the limit n → ∞, (xn, yn) → (0, 0). The fluctuations from
equilibrium have standard deviations σp = σq =
√
59 = 7.68.
A mixed strategy is a strict Nash equilibrium solution of a game if P and
Q maximizes their payoffs per move independently of each other. A mixed
strategy is a Nash bargain equilibrium solution of a game if E(sp|sp) is a
maximum.
In the case of the of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoff matrix
(2.5), by (2.7), we have,
P : E(sp|sq) = −5 − 4s0p + 16s0q − 4s0ps0q
Q : E(sq|sp) = −5 − 4s0q + 16s0p − 4s0ps0q (2.12)
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Maximizing E(sp|sq) in order to s0p and E(sq|sp) in order to s0q, the strict
Nash equilibrium of the game is obtained when both player choose the mixed
strategy (s0p, s1p) = (s0p, s1p) = (0, 1). In this case, the Nash equilibrium
state of the map β : K → K is the point (−5,−5) ∈ K. The Nash bargain
solution of the game is obtained from (2.12) with sp = sq, and is the point
(3, 3) ∈ K, Fig. 1. As both Nash solutions correspond to the choices of pure
strategies with probability 1, by (2.8), the fluctuations of the iterated game
have zero standard deviations. In general, a n-person non-cooperative game
has always a strict Nash equilibrium, [13].
The choice of a mixed strategy profile for a game has the advantage that
the iterates of the map β : K → K converges to the equilibrium solution
E(sp|sq). However, the choice of a mixed strategy profile implies that both
players have infinite memory, which, in real situations, is difficult or even
impossible to fulfil.
On the other hand, in some game theory approaches describing the global
behaviour of economic, social and evolutionary systems, there are a large
number of agents or players in mutual interaction. These individual agents
interact with the same rules and can also change partners along time. These
situations are difficult to interpret under the infinite memory hypothesis,
implicitly associated to the concept of mixed strategies.
Following this point of view, to evaluate a non-cooperative and sym-
metric game and their possible deterministic strategies (short memory), we
adopt the point of view of the statistical ensembles of statistical mechanics.
We suppose first that we have an infinite system composed by independent
subensembles, where in each subensemble we have two players playing the
same game with payoff matrix A. We call this ensemble of independent
games the uniform ensemble ([15, pp. 56]) of the game. This uniform en-
semble is characterized by the payoff matrix A, and the players P and Q are
the representative agents of the ensemble of the game.
In each subensemble, a game with payoff matrixA is played, and subensem-
bles are characterized by the mean payoffs per move of both players. The
global properties of the game will be described by the mean payoffs per move
averaged over all the subensembles. We say that the representative players
P and Q of the game have mean payoffs per move G¯p and G¯q, respectively,
where the average is taken over all the subensembles.
To evaluate a game, we first consider that each player chooses its pure
strategies with equal probabilities, and each subensemble is characterized by
the two sequences of pure strategies µ and σ. The properties of the game are
determined by G¯p and G¯q.
To evaluate a deterministic strategy or policy, we consider that in each
subensemble game, P plays with the deterministic policy f , and Q has a
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game record σ ∈ SN. Defining an ensemble probability density function ρq
for the occurrence of game record σ for player Q, the ensemble of games
will by characterized by the mean payoff per move of both players averaged
over the set of all allowed sequences σ ∈ SN with probability measure ρq.
These averages depend on f and ρq, and we can compare the performance of
a policy with the case where the players have no policies. Within the same
memory class, we use these ensemble averages to compare the mean payoffs
for different policies.
When both players have a deterministic policy, the mean payoffs per move
of the players depend on the finite number of initial conditions of the game.
3 The uniform ensemble of a game
We consider an ensemble of subsystems, where in each subsystem there are
two players playing the same game. We denote the game record of players P
and Q by µ and σ, respectively. As µ and σ are infinite sequences of ’0’ and
’1’, we can identify µ and σ as real numbers in the interval [0, 1] through,
x =
∞∑
i=1
µi
2i
, y =
∞∑
i=1
σi
2i
(3.1)
Relations (3.1) define a map φ : SN → [0, 1]. The map φ is an isomorphism,
except when (σ1, σ2, ...) or (µ1, µ2, ...) represents dyadic rational numbers,
[16]. As the set of dyadic rationals has zero Lebesgue measure, the infinite
sequence of moves of both players can be represented, almost everywhere, by
two real numbers x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the interval [0, 1] is naturally the
space of game records.
Making this identification between game records and real numbers, in
each subensemble game, by (2.4), the mean payoffs per move of the players
are,
Gp(µ, σ) = limn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1Aµiσi := Gp(x, y)
Gq(µ, σ) = limn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1Aσiµi := Gq(x, y)
(3.2)
where x, y ∈ [0, 1].
As each subensemble game is independent of the other, and each player’s
move is independent of the history of the game, we can assign ensemble
probability density functions to the game records. Let ρp(x) and ρq(y) be the
ensemble probability density functions of game records of the representative
players P and Q, respectively. For example, ρp(x)dx is the probability of
finding a subensemble with player P with a game record in an interval of
length dx centred around x.
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Assuming further that all the game records are equally probable, ρp(x) =
1 and ρq(y) = 1, the ensemble averages of the mean payoffs per move are,
G¯p =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Gp(x, y)ρp(x)ρq(y)dx dy =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Gp(x, y)dx dy
G¯q =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Gq(x, y)ρp(x)ρq(y)dx dy =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Gq(x, y)dx dy
(3.3)
To characterize the statistical ensemble of a non-cooperative and sym-
metric game with payoff matrix A, we now calculate the integrals in (3.3).
We consider the sequences of functions,
Gnp (µ, σ) =
1
n
∑n
i=1Aµiσi
Gnq (µ, σ) =
1
n
∑n
i=1Aσiµi
(3.4)
As n → ∞, Gnp (µ, σ) → Gp(µ, σ), and Gnq (µ, σ) → Gq(µ, σ). In the sense of
Lebesgue integration, the integrals in (3.3) can be calculated as the limits of
the integrals of the functions Gnp (µ, σ) and G
n
q (µ, σ).
Let us first take n = 1. By (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), we have,
G¯1p =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aµ1σ1dx dy
G¯1q =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aσ1µ1dx dy
(3.5)
where µ1 and σ1 are the first digits in the binary developments of x and
y, both in the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, the functions Aµ1σ1 ≡ Aµ1σ1(x, y)
and Aσ1µ1 ≡ Aσ1µ1(x, y) are piecewise constant in the unit square, and the
integrals in (3.5) are straightforwardly evaluated to,
G¯1p =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aµ1σ1dx dy =
1
22
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
G¯1q =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aσ1µ1dx dy =
1
22
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
(3.6)
Note that, the functions Aµ1σ1(x, y) and Aσ1µ1(x, y) are piecewise constant
functions from [0, 1]× [0, 1] to the set {A00, A01, A10, A11}.
In general, by (3.4) and (3.3),
G¯n+1p =
n
n+1
G¯np +
1
n+1
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aµn+1σn+1dx dy
G¯n+1q =
n
n+1
G¯nq +
1
n+1
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aσn+1µn+1dx dy
(3.7)
The functions Aµnσn ≡ Aµnσn(x, y) and Aσnµn ≡ Aσnµn(x, y) are piecewise
constant and assume the constant values A00, A01, A10 and A11 in squares of
side 1/2n. As, for each pair of indices (σn, µn), the domain where Aσnµn(x, y)
is constant is composed by 22(n−1) disjoint squares, we have,
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aµnσndx dy =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Aσnµndx dy
= 2
2(n−1)
22n
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
= 1
22
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
(3.8)
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Introducing (3.8) into (3.7), by induction, and taking the limit n → ∞, we
obtain the values of the ensemble average of the mean payoffs per move of
each player:
Theorem 3.1. We consider an ensemble of non-cooperative and symmet-
ric two-player game, where in each subensemble we have two players making
their choices with equal probabilities. Assume that each player’s move is in-
dependent of the history of the game and that the ensemble probability density
functions of each representative player are uniform in the interval [0, 1] of the
game records. Then, the mean payoffs per move of the representative players
of the game are equal and are given by,
G¯p = G¯q =
1
22
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
where the Aij are the entries of the payoff matrix.
In the uniform statistical ensemble of a non-cooperative and symmetric
game with all the players choosing their pure strategies with equal probabil-
ities, the average payoff per move is equal to the average value of the entries
of the payoff matrix A.
These elementary results can be straightforwardly generalized to non-
cooperative and non-symmetric n-player games.
4 Evaluating deterministic strategies
To evaluate the performance of a deterministic strategy in an iterated game,
we first enumerate the class of all the boolean functions f : Sm → S, where
S = {0, 1}. These boolean functions describe all the possible deterministic
strategies.
For each class of functions with memory length m, there are exactly 22
m
different functions. To enumerate a deterministic policy function within a
memory class m, f(σ(m)), where σ(m) = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ {0, 1}m, we introduce
an additional index n. Within each memory class m, each possible policy
function will be denoted by fm,n, where n =
∑2m−1
i=0 fm,n(σ
(m)
i )2
i is the policy
number, σ
(m)
i+1 = σ
(m)
i + (0, 0, . . . , 1), σ
(m)
0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0), and the ”plus” sym-
bols must be understood in the sense of binary arithmetic. For example, in
Table 1, we show all the possible deterministic policy functions with memory
length m = 1.
In this case, the deterministic TFT policy corresponds to the boolean
function f1,2. The functions f1,2 and f1,1 are GTFT policies with memory
length m = 1.
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f1,n(0) f1,n(1)
f1,0 0 0
f1,1 1 0
f1,2 0 1
f1,3 1 1
Table 1: Deterministic policy functions for m = 1.
Suppose now that the representative player P of a game has a policy fm,n
and the opponent player Q can have any game sequence σ = (σ1, σ2, ...).
Then, by (2.4), for the infinitely iterated game, the mean payoff per move
for each player is,
Gp(σ) = limM→∞
1
M
∑M
i=1Aµiσi
= limM→∞
1
M−m
∑M
i=m+1Afm,n(σi−m,...,σi−1)σi
Gq(σ) = limM→∞
1
M−m
∑M
i=m+1Aσifm,n(σi−m,...,σi−1)
(4.1)
and Gp and Gq are functions of σ = (σ1, σ2, ...) and fm,n. In the first m
iterations of the game, the accumulated mean payoffs depend on the initial
choices of the players. However, in the limit M → ∞, the dependence on
the initial choices vanishes.
Let us take the infinite sequence (σ1, σ2, ...) ∈ SN characterizing one of
the possible outcomes of the choices of the player Q, and define the real
number,
y =
∞∑
i=1
σi
2i
(4.2)
With this identification between infinite sequences of zeros and ones with
real numbers in the interval [0, 1], we write the mean payoffs as,
Gp(σ) ≡ Gp(y; fm,n) := Pm,n(y)
Gq(σ) ≡ Gq(y; fm,n) := Qm,n(y) (4.3)
Let us suppose now that we are in framework of statistical mechanics and
we have an ensemble or collectivity of players P and Q. In each subensemble
of the collectivity, the player P plays according to strategy fm,n and Q has
some game record y ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose additionally that all the subensembles
of the collectivity are independent.
As each member of the collectivity is independent of the others, we can
assign an ensemble density function ρq(y) to the collectivity. The function
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ρq(y) is the probability density of the game record y of player Q. If ρq(y) = 1,
all the game records of Q are equally probable. The uniform ensemble of the
game can then be characterized by the ensemble mean payoffs per move and
per player,
P¯m,n =
∫ 1
0
Pm,n(y)ρq(y)dy =
∫ 1
0
Pm,n(y)dy
Q¯m,n =
∫ 1
0
Qm,n(y)ρq(y)dy =
∫ 1
0
Qm,n(y)dy
(4.4)
In Fig. 2, we show the mean payoff functions Pm,n(y) and Qm,n(y) for
the TFT policy f1,2 and payoff matrix (2.5) of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
These functions have been calculated numerically from (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3).
Figure 2: Mean payoffs per move P1,2(y) and Q1,2(y) as a function of the
game record y ∈ [0, 1] of the player Q, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with
payoff matrix (2.5). Player P has TFT policy f1,2.
To calculate the mean payoffs P¯m,n and Q¯m,n given by (4.4), we first
approximate the functions Pm,n(y) and Qm,n(y) by sequences of piecewise
constant functions. By (4.1)-(4.3), we define the sequences of functions,
{PMm,n(y)}M≥m+1 and {QMm,n(y)}M≥m+1, as,
PMm,n(y) =
1
M−m
∑M
i=m+1Afm,n(σi−m,...,σi−1)σi
QMm,n(y) =
1
M−m
∑M
i=m+1Aσifm,n(σi−m,...,σi−1)
(4.5)
where (σ1, σ2, ...) is the binary development of y. For M ≥ m + 1, PMm,n(y)
and QMm,n(y) are piecewise constant functions in the interval [0, 1], and, in
the limit M →∞, they converge almost everywhere to Pm,n(y) an Qm,n(y),
Fig. 2. In the sense of Lebesgue integrations, this implies that,
limM→∞
∫ 1
0
PMm,n(y)dy = P¯m,n
limM→∞
∫ 1
0
QMm,n(y)dy = Q¯m,n
(4.6)
Let us now calculate the integrals in (4.6). For M = m+ 1, by (4.5), we
have,
Pm+1m,n (y) = Afm,n(σ1,...,σm)σm+1
Qm+1m,n (y) = Aσm+1fm,n(σ1,...,σm)
(4.7)
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As (σ1, . . . , σm+1) represents the first m+1 terms of the binary development
of y, the functions in (4.7) assume constant values in subintervals of [0, 1] of
length 1/2m+1. In each of these subintervals, Pm+1m,n (y) and Q
m+1
m,n (y) assume
one of the four values: A00, A01, A10 and A11.
Associated to each deterministic policy function fm,n, we define the num-
bers,
nm,n0 = #{σ(m) ∈ {0, 1}m : fm,n(σ(m)) = 0}
nm,n1 = #{σ(m) ∈ {0, 1}m : fm,n(σ(m)) = 1}
(4.8)
and, nm,n0 + n
m,n
1 = 2
m.
Under these conditions, by (4.7) and (4.8), we have,
∫ 1
0
Pm+1m,n (y)dy =
1
2m
(
nm,n0
(A00+A01)
2
+ nm,n1
(A10+A11)
2
)
= 1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A01) + n
m,n
1 (A10 + A11))∫ 1
0
Qm+1m,n (y)dy =
1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A10) + n
m,n
1 (A01 + A11))
(4.9)
For M > m+ 1, by (4.5), we have,
PM+1m,n (y) =
M−m
M−m+1
PMm,n(y) +
1
M+1−m
Afm,n(σM+1−m,...,σM)σM+1
QM+1m,n (y) =
M−m
M−m+1
QMm,n(y) +
1
M+1−m
AσM+1fm,n(σM+1−m,...,σM)
(4.10)
and, as in (4.9),
∫ 1
0
PM+1m,n (y)dy =
M−m
M−m+1
∫ 1
0
PMm,n(y)dy
+ 1
2m+1(M+1−m)
(nm,n0 (A00 + A01) + n
m,n
1 (A10 + A11))∫ 1
0
QM+1m,n (y)dy =
M−m
M−m+1
∫ 1
0
QMm,n(y)dy
+ 1
2m+1(M+1−m)
(nm,n0 (A00 + A10) + n
m,n
1 (A01 + A11))
(4.11)
By (4.9) and by induction from (4.11), we obtain,
∫ 1
0
PM+1m,n (y)dy =
1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A01) + n
m,n
1 (A10 + A11))∫ 1
0
QM+1m,n (y)dy =
1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A10) + n
m,n
1 (A01 + A11))
(4.12)
As the integrals in (4.12) are independent of M , by (4.6), we have proved:
Theorem 4.1. We consider an ensemble of non-cooperative and symmetric
two-player games, where in each subensemble we have a player P playing
with deterministic policy fm,n, and a player Q making the choices of pure
strategies with equal probabilities. Then, the mean payoffs per move of the
representative players of the game depend on the payoff matrix A and on the
strategy fm,n, and the mean payoffs per move are,
P¯m,n =
1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A01) + n
m,n
1 (A10 + A11))
Q¯m,n =
1
2m+1
(nm,n0 (A00 + A10) + n
m,n
1 (A01 + A11))
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where the Aij are the entries of the payoff matrix, n
m,n
0 = #{σ(m) ∈ {0, 1}m :
fm,n(σ
(m)) = 0}, and nm,n1 = #{σ(m) ∈ {0, 1}m : fm,n(σ(m)) = 1}.
This theorem has a direct consequence. With the definitions of Section
2, a policy or strategy fm,n is equalitarian if the mean payoffs of the repre-
sentative players are equal. Imposing the equality between P¯m,n and Q¯m,n in
Theorem 4.1, we obtain,
nm,n0 (A01 −A10) + nm,n1 (A10 −A01) = 0 (4.13)
From (4.13) it follows that a policy is equalitarian if either nm,n0 = n
m,n
1
or, A01 = A10. In the first case, we have the class of all GTFT policies,
independently of the values of the entries of the payoff matrix A.
If A01 = A10, it follows from Theorem 4.1 and (4.13), that,
P¯m,n = Q¯m,n =
nm,n0
2m+1
(A00 −A11) + 1
2
A11 +
1
2
A01 (4.14)
where we have introduced the relation nm,n1 = 2
m−nm,n0 . Therefore, we have:
Corollary 4.2. We consider an ensemble of non-cooperative and symmetric
two-player games with payoff matrix A, where in each subensemble we have
a player P playing strategy fm,n, and a player Q making the choices of pure
strategies with equal probabilities. Then the policy fm,n is equalitarian if
either, it is GTFT or, A01 = A10. Moreover, the payoffs per move of GTFT
policies are given by,
P¯m,n = Q¯m,n =
1
22
(A00 + A01 + A10 + A11)
For example, in games with memory length m = 1, independently of the
payoff matrix A, the equalitarian strategies are f1,1 and f1,2, both GTFT.
From the point of view of the ensemble mean payoffs per move, all the GTFT
strategies are equivalent to ensemble games where all player play randomly
with equal probability.
We determine now the best policy for a player P with an opponent Q
choosing pure strategies with equal probabilities. By Theorem 4.1, and with
nm,n1 = 2
m − nm,n0 , we obtain,
P¯m,n =
nm,n0
2m+1
(A00 + A01 − A11 −A10) + 1
2
(A11 + A10) (4.15)
Therefore, in the sense of ensemble average and for a given memory length
m, the best policies for the player P are the ones that maximise (4.15), for
all the choices of the integers nm,n0 = 0, . . . , 2
m.
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5 Both players have deterministic strategies
When the two representative players P and Q have deterministic strategies
within the same memory class, their game records become dependent of the
first m moves of the players. As we have two players and 2m different initial
conditions for each player, for each choice of a pair of deterministic strate-
gies, there are at most 2m+1 different payoffs per move for both players. As
there are 22
m
different boolean functions of memory length m, the maximum
number of equilibrium states is, 22
m+1 × 2m+1, which, for m = 1, is 64.
Let us analyse now in detail the case of memory length m = 1. If µ1 and
σ1 represent the choices for the first move of players P and Q, and P and Q
have policies f ≡ f1,r and g ≡ f1,s, respectively, their game records are,
P : (µ1, f(σ1), f · g(µ1), f · g · f(σ1), . . .)
Q : (σ1, g(µ1), g · f(σ1), g · f · g(µ1), . . .)
where f · g(µ1) = f(g(µ1)). After a few moves, the game records become
periodic. Therefore, the mean payoff per move of each player can be calcu-
lated by the periodic sequences which depend on the initial moves and on the
policies. For example, with f ≡ f1,2 and g ≡ f1,2, and initial moves µ1 = 0
and σ1 = 1, we obtain the game records,
P : (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .)
Q : (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .)
and the mean payoff per move of both players is P¯ = Q¯ = (A01 + A10)/2.
But for the initial moves µ1 = 0 and σ1 = 0, we have, P¯ = Q¯ = A00.
In Table 2, we show the mean payoffs per move and per player, for all
the deterministic policies with memory length m = 1 and all the possible
four different initial moves of the players. Counting the different values in
the entries in table, we conclude that, for m = 1, the number of equilibrium
states is 7. For a given game, the best strategy and initial conditions is
obtained by analyzing the entries of Table 2. Clearly, the best strategy
depends on the entries of the payoff matrix of the game.
In general, let (µ1, . . . , µm) and (σ1, . . . , σm) be the first m moves of play-
ers P and Q, respectively. Suppose further that player P and Q choose the
deterministic strategies fm,n and gm,n, respectively. Iterating the game, after
some transient iteration the game record sequences become periodic, and the
mean payoffs per move and per player are easily calculated. If (µi+1, . . . , µi+p)
and (σi+1, . . . , σi+p), for some i ≥ 1, are the periodic patterns of period p of
the game record sequences, the mean payoffs per move of the players are,
P : 1
p
(Aµi+1σi+1 + . . .+ Aµi+pσi+p)
Q : 1
p
(Aσi+1µi+1 + . . .+ Aσi+pµi+p)
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P : f1,0(
µ1
σ1
)
Q : f1,0 Q : f1,1 Q : f1,2 Q : f1,3
A00 P : A01; Q : A10 A00 P : A01; Q : A10
P : f1,1(
µ1
σ1
)
Q : f1,0 Q : f1,1 Q : f1,2 Q : f1,3
(
0
0
)
P : A10; Q : A01
A11+A00
2
B
4
P : A01; Q : A10(
0
1
)
P : A10; Q : A01 P : A01; Q : A10
B
4
P : A01; Q : A10(
1
0
)
P : A10; Q : A01 P : A10; Q : A01
B
4
P : A01; Q : A10(
1
1
)
P : A10; Q : A01
A11+A00
2
B
4
P : A01; Q : A10
P : f1,2(
µ1
σ1
)
Q : f1,0 Q : f1,1 Q : f1,2 Q : f1,3
(
0
0
)
A00
B
4
A00 A11(
0
1
)
A00
B
4
A10+A01
2
A11(
1
0
)
A00
B
4
A10+A01
2
A11(
1
1
)
A00
B
4
A11 A11
P : f1,3(
µ1
σ1
)
Q : f1,0 Q : f1,1 Q : f1,2 Q : f1,3
P : A10; Q : A01 P : A10; Q : A01 A11 A11
Table 2: Mean payoffs per move of players P and Q as a function of the initial
move and policies with memory length m = 1. In the first and forth tables,
the mean payoffs per move of player Q are independent of the initial move.
To simplify the notation, we have done B = (A00 +A01 +A10 +A11). When
an entry shows only one payoff, this payoff is the same for both players. The
TFT strategy corresponds to the deterministic strategy function f1,2, and
f1,1 and f1,2 are GTFT policies.
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and these mean payoffs are the equilibrium states of the game. For example,
for m = 2, we have at most 22
2+1 × 22+1 = 2048 equilibrium states.
6 Examples and policy analysis
The formalism introduced in the previous sections leads to the evaluation of
policies for an iterated game with a given payoff matrix A. In this context,
we can forget the role of players P and Q and speak about the performance
of the game, the performance of a deterministic strategy and the relative
performance of two deterministic strategies.
We analyze now two examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the
Hawk-Dove game.
6.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoff matrix (2.5), if all players make
their choices with equal probabilities, by Theorem 3.1, the mean payoff per
move and per player is zero. By Corollary 4.2, a player with a GTFT policy
against a player choosing its pure strategies randomly has also zero payoffs.
This includes the simplest case of the tit-for-tat policy.
From the point of view of the non-deterministic map β : K → K, the
situation of Theorem 3.1 corresponds to the equilibrium solution (0, 0) ∈ K,
Fig. 3a).
In the case of Theorem 4.1 and for deterministic strategies with mem-
ory length m = 1, there are three equilibrium solutions for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. These equilibrium solutions are: (−3, 7) ∈ K, (0, 0) ∈ K
and (3,−7) ∈ K, Fig. 1b). So, in a uniform collectivity, the players that
choose the dominant strategy have a better payoff, provided their partners
choose their strategies with equal probabilities.
Suppose now that both representative players P and Q adopt a policy
with memory length m = 1. Analysing the results of Table 2, the best payoff
per move for both players is obtained when player P and Q play tit-for-tat
and both choose the initial strategy ’0’. The best payoff per move is also
obtained when one at least of the contenders chooses ’0’ and the other plays
according the tit-for-tat policy. In the case of policies of memory length
m = 1, the tit-for-tit policy forces cooperation. If one of the player plays
tit-for-tat and the other player chooses another strategy, tit-for-tit ensures
that the payoffs per move of both players are equal and the second player
is not able to increase its payoff per move. If both players choose a tit-
for-tat policy, depending on the initial condition, we can have four different
19
Figure 3: State space K and equilibrium solutions of the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. In a), all the players in the collectivity choose their strate-
gies with equal probabilities. In b), we have three possible equilibrium states.
In each subensemble game one player follows a deterministic strategy with
memory length m = 1, and the other chooses its pure strategies with equal
probabilities. Depending on the adopted policy, we can have different equi-
librium states. In c), all the players have chosen a deterministic strategy
with memory length m = 1, and the game can have seven equilibrium states.
equilibrium states of the game, Table 2 and Fig. 1c). In this case, two of
them are the strict and the bargain Nash solutions. If one of the players
chooses always the strategy ’1’, it corresponds to the deterministic policy
f1,3, and the outcome of the game against a tit-for-tat corresponds to the
Nash strict equilibrium of the game. The seven equilibrium solutions of the
Prisoner’s game are plotted in Fig. 3c).
If P has to choose a policy against a player Q that plays its strategies
with equal probabilities, by (4.15) and (2.5), the best policy for P is the one
that maximizes,
P¯m,n =
(
3− 12 n
m,n
0
2m+1
)
Therefore, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the best policy corresponds to
nm,n0 = 0, which corresponds to the policy function fm,2m−1. In this case, we
have, P¯m,2m−1 = 3 and Q¯m,2m−1 = −7, Fig. 3b).
A more detailed analysis of Fig. 3, shows that Nash bargain solutions
and Nash strict solutions only exist when both players have deterministic
policies. In the sense of ensemble averages, Nash solutions are not equilibrium
solutions of a game.
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6.2 The Hawk-Dove game
The Hawk-Dove game has been introduced by Maynard-Smith and Price [17]
as a game theoretical basic model to describe animal conflicts. They have
assumed two pure strategies: Hawk (’0’) and Dove (’1’). A player chooses
Hawk or ’0’ if he acts fiercely, and chooses Dove or ’1’ if he looks fierce
and then retires. In the context of evolutionary biology, this game aims to
explain the struggle for a territory whose payoff is related with the number
of offsprings. The payoff matrix of the Hawk-Dove game is,
A =
(
1
2
(r − c) r
0 r
2
+ ε
)
where r represents the reproductive value and c is the cost of injury. In this
game the Hawk strategy is dominant, provided c < r and ε < r/2. If ε > 0
and ε < r/2, the Hawk-Dove game is also dilemmatic. Globally, the species
has advantage if everybody acts Dove, which is the non-dominant strategy.
If all players choose their strategies with equal probability, by Theorem
3.1, the mean payoff per player and move is,
P¯ = Q¯ =
1
2
(r − 1
4
c) + ε
If c < 4r + 8ε, P¯ = Q¯ > 0, the Hawk-Dove game shows advantage for the
species. If c ≥ 4r + 8ε, the cost of injury is too high and globally the mean
payoff per player and move is non-positive.
If the representative players of the game choose a generalized tit-for-tat
policy with memory length m = 1, and c < r, both players have a positive
mean payoff per move. If the players choose not being the first to play Hawk,
they both obtain the highest mean payoffs per move.
In the Hawk-Dove non-cooperative and symmetric game, the tit-for-tat
policy or imitation of the adversary move implies a positive payoff for both
players, provided the cost of injury is not too high (c < 4r + 8ε).
7 Conclusions
The dynamics of an iterated game is described by a one-to-many map defined
on a state space, [14]. Within this framework, the concept of mixed strategy
leads to the definition of the equilibrium solution of a game. This equilibrium
solution is obtained as the limit of the iterates of a one-to-many map. In
general, for a specific game, the equilibrium solutions associated to the set of
all mixed strategies span the state space of the game. The concepts of strict
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Nash equilibrium and bargain solutions of a game are discussed within this
framework.
In applications of game theory to economics, ethics, sociology, biology,
physics, etc., it is sometimes easy to identify rules of behaviour and inter-
actions between agents and to make guesses about payoffs. However, it is
difficult to argue about the (infinite) memory of all the past choices of the
players, and to insure that opponent players remain the same during all the
iterated game. Therefore, the way of evaluating a game, or a policy depends
on the context in which the game is considered.
In order to evaluate a game, we have introduced the concept of represen-
tative ensemble of a game. This technique has been applied to the global
evaluation of a game, without any specific considerations about policies. In
this evaluation, all the players make their choices of pure strategies with
equal probabilities. In this case, we have shown that the mean payoffs per
move of the players are the mean value of the entries of the payoff matrices
of the game.
To evaluate a deterministic policy with a finite memory length, we have
calculated the mean payoffs per move of the players, for the case where one
of the players has a deterministic policy and the other player chooses its
pure strategies with equal probabilities. In this case, there exists a class
of deterministic policies that forces equality of the mean payoffs per move
of the players. This class of policies is the class of generalized tit-for-tat
policies. When a representative player has a generalized tit-for-tat policy, in
the limit of the iterated game, the payoffs of both representative players are
equal. If a player tries to increase its payoff by changing its strategy and
the other player plays tit-for-tat, the change in the strategy can increase or
decrease the payoffs, but the payoffs per move of both players remain equal.
Generalized tit-for-tat or imitation strategies force equalitarian payoffs per
move. In dilemmatic games, the generalized tit-for-tat policy together with
the condition of not being the first to defect, leads to the highest possible
mean payoffs per move for the players.
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